(AGH University of Science and Technology Press, 2017) Stach, Izabella
This paper is devoted to the concept of indirect control in corporate shareholding networks. This topic is important in financial economics. Since shareholding size does not actually reflect an investor's power-control in corporate shareholding networks, diverse approaches to measuring the control-power of investors has been proposed. We focus in particular on a game-theoretical approach, specifically the model of Denti and Prati (2001) and its implementation to control sharing analysis and simulation in shareholding networks thanks to the computer program »Control Sharing Simulation«.
In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular, we consider the Public Good index (Holler, 1982), the Public Good value (Holler and Li, 1995), the Public Help index (Bertini et al., 2008), the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also called the Zipke index (Nevison et al., 1978), and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values.
